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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
We mean distinctly to assert that where money is paid by one
under a mistake of his rights and his duty, and which he was
under no legal or moral obligation to pay, and which the re-
cipient has no right in good conscience to retain, it may be re-
covered back in an action of indebitatus assumpsit whether such
mistake be one of fact or law; and this we insist may be done
both upon principle of Christian morals and the common law.2 1
Even though the result reached by the court is in accord with the ma-
jority of jurisdictions today, its adoption of the conduit theory and its
interpretation of section 5(3) to allocate capital gains dividends to prin-
cipal has created more problems than it has solved. It is apparent that the
only solution rests with the legislature. A bill2" providing for the alloca-
tion of capital gains dividends to income was introduced in 1961; the
bill died in committee. But the confusion in this area today indicates it
is time for the legislature to act to resolve the problems which have
arisen out of mutual fund distributions.
Richard E. Myers
CRIMINAL LAw-Criminal Procedure-Accused's loss of memory sur-
rounding events of alleged criminal act held not to entitle him to a dis-
charge from the indictment or stay of proceedings.
Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d
758(1966).
Relator was indicted for first degree murder. The only evidence pre-
sented of the alleged murder was circumstantial and, at best, incon-
clusive.1 A pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed re-
questing that (1) the murder indictment be dismissed and relator be
discharged from custody, or (2) the trial on the indictment be post-
poned. The petition averred that while the relator was at no time insane
or incompetent, he was suffering from a permanent loss of memory of
the events and circumstances implicating him in the alleged murder. In
dismissing the petition the lower court found that relator was not feign-
ing the amnesia but did not determine its expected duration. On appeal
the supreme court held, with two Justices dissenting, ". . . that defendant
is not entitled at this time (1) to a discharge from the indictment, or
(2) to a stay of proceedings .... 112
25. Union Trust Company of N.Y. v. Gilpin, 235 Pa. 524, 530 (1912).
26. House Bill 592, Session of 1961.
1. The ballistics report stated only that the bullets taken from the victim were of the
same general class characteristics as bullets test-fired from the revolver which police had
found in relator's car. A more positive identification was not made.
2. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 406, 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966).
[Vol. 5:94
RECENT DECISIONS
Initially, the court recognized that three prior Pennsylvania cases
had treated amnesia as an "affirmative defense,"3 but it rejected this
reasoning. Since the relator's amnesia admittedly occurred only after
the alleged criminal act, it was held that there was no ground for sus-
taining his first position, namely, that he was immune from criminal
prosecution."
The court next turned to a consideration of the question of the
relator's mental ability to stand trial. Counsel for the accused argued
that he was, under the Mental Health Act of 19511 or the common law
test,6 unable to stand trial. The Mental Health Act standard7 was recog-
nized by the court as being more inclusive than the test of "legal in-
sanity" applied in Pennsylvania. But the court went on to reject the
relator's contention that under the Act he was unable to stand trial,
since by his own admission he was presently sane and competent and
not "in need of care in a mental hospital." 8 In these situations the com-
mon law test (i.e., that the accused be able to comprehend his position
and assist-his counsel in making a rational defense) 9 is actually broader
than the Mental Health Act standard, since the relator, whose condition
3. In Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 229, 109 Ati. 878, 880 (1920), Justice
Kephart, writing the majority opinion, stated that "aphasia" is one of the affirmative defenses
which defendant must establish by fairly preponderating evidence. Later, in Commonwealth
v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 512, 123 At. 486, 490 (1924), Justice Kephart corrected his use of
the word "aphasia" to mean ". . . that form of insanity called amnesia . . . ." Again in
Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 At. 823 (1935), amnesia was recognized as an
affirmative defense. However, in each of these cases the defense argued insanity at the time
of the criminal act. In Price there is no indication that the loss of memory is related to
an independently operative mental defect at the time of the crime.
4. The analysis of the court is sound since amnesia is directly relevant to the issue of
relator's criminal responsibility only to the extent that the evidence of amnesia corroborates
other evidence of an actual mental defect operative at the time of the alleged criminal act.
Relator offered no such evidence. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 111-15 & nn.16, 19, & 27
(1960).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1071-1622 (1954).
6. In Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 205, 150 A.2d 102, 105 (1959), the com-
mon law test used to determine the mental capacity of a defendant to stand trial was
distinguished from the "right-wrong" test. The crucial question is twofold-whether the
defendant is able to comprehend his position and assist his counsel in making a rational
defense. See WEmoFEN, MENTAL DisoRDEa AS A CRihSNAL DFENSE, 428-30 (1954).
7. Section 102(11) of the Mental Health Act of 1951 defines mental illness as ". . . an
illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judgment
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or
advisable for him to be under care." PA. STAT. AN. tit. 50, § 1072(11) (1954).
8. The controlling factor in determining whether one is within the purview of this Act
was stated in Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 28, 117 A.2d 96, 102 (1955), as being
"... the degree or extent to which the mind is affected by the mental disorder and not the
bare existence of symptoms which would induce a psychiatrist to diagnose a mental illness."
9. Mr. Chief Justice Bell, in his dissenting and concurring opinion in Commonwealth v.
Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 31, 117 A.2d 96, 103 (1955), stated ". . . the test applicable for a con-
tinuance because of alleged insanity or mental incapacity is ... the ability of the accused
... to make or aid his counsel in making a proper defense."
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is otherwise one that does not require commitment under the Act, may
be nevertheless incapable of assisting counsel in presenting his defense."
Relator was admittedly outside the first criterion of the common law
test since he admitted that he was completely sane and able to compre-
hend that he was accused of the crime of murder. The majority further
concluded that he was as able to cooperate with counsel as is one who
claims to have been intoxicated at the time of the incident in question.
Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's order dismissing rela-
tor's pretrial petition and relator was held for trial.
One cannot readily differ with the court's reasoning regarding the in-
applicability of the Mental Health Act standards to the facts. A more
difficult problem, however, is raised regarding the correct application of
the common law test, or in the alternative, the validity of the test itself.
The question of the amnesic defendant's ability to cooperate with coun-
sel in making a rational defense is one not easily answered. To further
complicate a resolution of the issue, it must be recognized that recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court designed to protect the
fundamental right of the accused to be effectively represented by coun-
sel" should have been considered by this court in reaching its conclu-
sions."
As recently as 1959, in the case of Regina v. Podola,3 the defendant
argued that hysterical amnesia which caused a total loss of memory of
the period surrounding the crime ". . . rendered him unable to properly
instruct his advisers, with the consequence that he could not make 'a
proper defence' " although there was no suggestion that his mind in other
respects was not completely normal. 4 The English court, in rejecting
this reasoning, stated that the accused was physically and mentally cap-
able of instructing counsel as to what defense to make even though that
defense had the peculiarity of including in it features which the accused
had entirely forgotten.' 5
10. Mr. Chief Justice Bell stated in Price that "... it is possible there may be reasons
for a stay of proceedings, other than that of statutory mental illness." Commonwealth ex rel.
Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 406, 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966). See Slough & Wilson,
Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593, 597 (1960).
11. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1958),
implied that the criminal defendant has this fundamental right to the ". . . effective repre-
sentation of counsel." (Emphasis added.) While the decision in Spano turned on facts
unrelated to Price, it is judicial recognition of the petitioner's right to effective representa-
tion of counsel. The relevant question is whether counsel is able to effectively represent the
petitioner when the latter is incapable of assisting counsel because of a total loss of memory.
12. Justice Cohen, dissenting in Price, stated "... . that the constitutional right to counsel
would be a sham if defense counsel were not able to prepare a proper defense." Common-
wealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 408, 218 A.2d 758, 764 (1966).
13 [1959] 3 All. E.R. 418.
14. Id. at 430.
15. Id. at 432.
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The result of a strict application of the Podola rule may be inconsis-
tent with the policy factors underlying the recent "right to counsel"
cases as well as those which led the courts to establish a test of the ac-
cused's mental ability to stand trial.16 Consequently, a functional ap-
proach to an application of the common law test has been suggested.17
Under this view the emphasis is placed on the defendant's actual mental
ability to assist in his own defense, rather than on the presence or ab-
sence of a narrowly defined mental disorder.' Notwithstanding these
factors, the Podola rule is the view adopted by the majority of the juris-
dictions which have considered the question.
On the other hand, as the court in Price notes, it would be unrealistic
for the law to permanently release a defendant, against whom a prima
facie case of murder has been established without acquittal unless the
defendant is "legally insane."" The disadvantages to an amnesic de-
fendant of a denial of his pretrial request for a stay in the proceedings,2"
vis-d-vis the undesirable effects of a delegation of judicial and legislative
functions to experts in psychiatry 2' presents an equally difficult question
for judicial determination. Moreover, the necessity for a prompt and or-
derly administration of criminal justice suggests that amnesic defendants
resort to less dilatory methods than a stay in the proceedings. Some
remedies that have been suggested include opening to the accused dis-
covery procedures not normally available to criminal defendants and
restricting the admission of certain evidence by the prosecution. 22
Looking to the present state of the law with its increasing emphasis
on safe-guarding the constitutional rights of the accused, especially the
right to counsel, the court would do well to heed the warning expressed
by Justice Cohen in his dissent and arrive at some solution which would
primarily emphasize protection of all the constitutional rights of the
amnesic defendant and only secondarily concern itself with those pro-
cedural pre-trial remedies28 which are presumably less radical than those
sought by the relator in the present action.
Louis B. Loughren
16. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 116 (1960).
17. Id. at 116-18.
18. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 117 & nn.43 & 44 (1960). See generally, Oliver, Judicial
Hearings to Determine Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 39 F.R.D. 523, 537-52 (1965).
19. Commonwealth ex el. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 407, 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966).
20. Slough & Wilson, supra note 11, at 601.
21. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 129-30 (1960).
22. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 132-36 & n.110 (1960).
23. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 109 n.59 for authority to support granting reasonable con-
tinuances "when it is shown by competent medical testimony that amnesia is no more than
temporary."
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